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Abstract— Because of the increasing developments of hu-
manoid robots, humans and robots are going to interact more
and more often in the near future. Thus, the need for a
well-defined ethical framework in which these interactions
will take place is very acute. In this article, we will show
why responsibility ascription is a key concept to understand
today’s and tomorrow’s ethical issues related to human-robot
interactions. By analyzing how the myths surrounding the
figure of the robot in western societies have been built through
centuries, we will be able to demonstrate that the question of
responsibility ascription is biased in the sense that it assigns to
autonomous robots a role that should be devoted to humans.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of some technologies, such as genetics
or nuclear technology, has brought with it the specter of
dangers so deadly that the ethical questions raised needed
to be tackled for these new disciplines to survive. Robotics,
an expanding science at the crossroads of several branches,
is also arriving at a stage where its integration and impact
on everyone’s lives raises ethical questions like “Who is
responsible for the actions of a robot” or “What could be the
consequences of augmenting human capabilities by robotic
means” ? To answer these interrogations, a new branch of
ethics has been developing in recent years.
A. The birth of roboethics
Known as roboethics, this branch shares a number of
features with computer ethics but is also at the junction
of several disciplines [1] : artificial intelligence, philosophy,
ethics, theology, biology, physiology, cognitive science, neu-
roscience, law, sociology, psychology and industrial design.
Although it covers a wide domain, roboethics has not been
considered as a field in itself until recently, which explains
why this subject is specifically covered by only a few
periodic publications.
However, since the first Symposium on Roboethics, held in
Sanremo in 2004, the domain has become very dynamic. This
meeting, which gathered philosophers, jurists, sociologists,
anthropologists and roboticians can thus be considered as a
real catalyst for the development of studies on the subject.
Since then, many conferences have taken place and have
led notably to the Roboethics Roadmap [1], a document that
highlights the different ethical questions related to robotics.
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As robots will come to interact more and more with naive
human users, determining who can be held responsible in
case of an accident is likely to be of increasing importance.
We will thus focus in this article on the ethical question of
ascribing responsibility to robots in the case of human-robot
interactions (hereafter HRI).
Basing ourselves on the existing approaches to the re-
sponsibility ascription problem, we will discuss how the
mythical imagery of robots present in the Western society
influences our picturing of ethical problems. In this, we
follow the approach taken in the roadmap and we consider
that ethical questions touching to the emergence in robots of
human functions such as consciousness, free will or emotions
as premature, given the limitation of current robot control
systems. Instead, we think that there is a strong need for
an ethical reflection on the motivations behind humanoid
robotics and on the ideal of society it implies, in the sense
that scientists should feel responsible of their ”creations” and
their social implications (see for example [2], [3])
B. Plan
We will proceed as follows : in the first chapter, we will
define responsibility from both a philosophical and a juridical
point-of-view. This will lead us to consider previous works
on the subject which offer different perspectives on how
to answer the responsibility ascription problem for robots.
Afterwards, we will analyze the influence of history on
that question and, during this journey through the centuries,
we will show how a specific image of mechanical beings
was progressively built in western countries. We will then
discuss how this mythology surrounding robots influences
the responsibility ascription problem. Before concluding, we
will briefly discuss the importance of the scientist’s role in
responsibility ascription and its relation with the predominant
question of the precautionary principle.
II. MACHINES AS RESPONSIBLE AGENTS
As argued previously, we will focus on the responsibility
ascription problem, which we view as a central question of
HRI. To illustrate this problem, let us imagine the following
situation (from [4, p. 179]) : an autonomous robot dog, able
to modulate its walking gait to adapt to its environment,
decides that the most appropriate means of crossing a carpet
is running. During its run, it bumps into a child who,
subsequently, falls and hurts herself. Who is responsible
for this accident ? The robot constructor, because s/he did
not include a control modality to let the robot stop when
seeing an obstacle? Or is it the parents’ responsibility to
evaluate the danger that robots can create for children and
act preventively, as they do for all other appliances? These
questions are within the scope of the responsibility ascription
problem we are going to examine now.
A. The concept of responsibility
For starters, let us define what the term responsibility
covers and how it should be understood in the context of
ethics. For the Petit dictionnaire d’e´thique (Small Dictionary
of Ethics) [5], the definition of responsibility contains three
main terms : a person to ascribe it to, a domain where it can
be applied and an instance where it should be assumed (like
a tribunal, a conscience or people concerned by a decision).
Thanks to the notion of responsibility,
“somebody becomes a law subject or a moral
subject [. . . ] that must face his acts and their con-
sequences and that may be punished or rewarded
[. . . ] with social esteem, scorn or moral respect.”[5,
our translation]
In addition to this moral responsibility, there exists a juridical
responsibility (including liability) which relates to one’s
capacity to be accountable for one’s acts. The law considers
also cases where a reduction of this responsibility is possible,
such as when suffering from mental illness, actions per-
formed under duress or when in a state of distress. It is thus
easy to conceive that determining someone’s responsibility is
not straightforward, even in daily human-human interactions.
Moreover, from a legal perspective, responsibility implies
that the agent has a conscious control of his/her behavior
and of its consequences (see Fischer and Ravizza [6]).
This implies that an agent, such as a robot, could be held
responsible if, and only if, it can be demonstrated that the
agent was free to take a decision and was able to choose
among alternatives to this decision. When machines are
involved in accidents, the law traditionally considers that the
person who controls the machine is responsible, as long as
the machine is functioning according to its specifications.
When this is not the case, the maker of the machine assumes
this role. It is thus possible to transfer responsibility from
one agent to another and this is what the manufacturer of a
product does through the user manual.
Keeping the above in mind, we will now examine the
responsibility ascription problem when it comes to robots
capable of adapting and learning new skills.
B. The responsibility ascription problem
For Matthias [4], the notion of control is primordial in
responsibility ascription : as soon as the control on a machine
is diminished, so is the responsibility of the controller. He
takes as an example the hypothetical case of a robot sent
to Mars for which there is a twenty-minute lag between the
moment an order is given and its execution. Who bears the
responsibility when the robot falls into a hole or can not be
recovered because visibility was bad ? Is it the technician
who was controlling the robot ? The answer given in his
article is simply that nobody is responsible in that case and
that is the reason why insurances exist, i.e. for sharing the
costs of an accident among a group of people when nobody
can be held responsible.
What happens then, when machines are capable of even
a small amount of autonomy (in the robotics sense, i.e.
independence of control) ? For Matthias, this depends on
how the machines acquired this autonomy. When they first
appeared, robots were programmed using “imperative” lan-
guages. All of their operations were then strictly sequenced
and chosen carefully by the programmer. If an error occurred
in the code, in almost every case (except for hardware
failures), the programmer was sole responsible for this error.
However, this kind of programming method does not allow
unforeseeable situations to be dealt with easily, and thus
newer methods were developed to compensate for the rigidity
of the traditional programming techniques.
Neural networks, genetic algorithms and expert systems
enabled the development of autonomous agents possessing
a certain amount of flexibility and adaptability to their
environment : with them, it became possible for these agents
to acquire experience by themselves during their work.
However, this flexibility comes with a price : it becomes
almost impossible to test exhaustively every behavior of the
system. In fact, how could all cases be examined when the
purpose of such systems is to adapt to every situation, notably
when they are not anticipated ? Autonomy implies a loss
of control on the programmer’s end and, thus, according to
Matthias, a lessening of the programmer’s responsibility. A
responsibility gap is thus generated by the transformation of
the traditional role of the programmer : if in the past the
complete specification of the robot’s behavior was given, the
usage of higher-level control methods (more abstract in a
way), where actions are hidden in a “layer of obscurity” [4,
p. 182], implies for Matthias that nobody can be held for
responsible in case of problem.
C. Critical answer
On the existence of such a “responsibility gap”, Marino
and Tamburrini [7] retort that the question of control was
considered in that case in too wide a frame. For them,
Matthias goes too far when he says that robot’s creators are
freed from their responsibility because they do not have total
control over the causal chains implied in the construction of
such robots :
“Here the scope of CR [control requirement] is
overstretched [. . . , CR] is not necessary for respon-
sibility ascription, and the alleged responsibility
gap depending on it concerns moral responsibil-
ity ascriptions only [. . . ]. Traditional concepts of
responsibility ascription exist for these problems
and have been routinely applied in the exercise of
justice.”[7, p. 49]
These two authors propose the application of legal principles
to fill this gap that, in their opinion, resembles the responsi-
bility parents have to face towards minor children. Moreover,
they explain that the situation is in reality simplified because
the robots creators decided themselves to give a robot its
independence. The nature of this autonomy as well as its
limitations are thus the result of a deliberate choice, and the
robots’ creators can not simply reject all responsibility. Note
here that this is also the case with manufacturers : they keep
a share of the liability, even after a user has read the manual,
and can not reject all responsibility.
D. Responsibility ascription
As depicted by Asaro in [8], legal responsibility might be
a good entry point to consider responsibility ascription for
machines because, in contrast to moral responsibility, the
justice system gives a precise framework to the question.
Currently, moral responsibility suffers from the lack of a
unified theory whereas the law provides more practical
answers. This framework might seem restrictive to examine
all the implications of the situation, however, observing the
fact that legal responsibility can be considered as a subset
of moral responsibility so to speak, it already provides an
interesting perspective.
In his article, Asaro proposes, in the absence of a better
solution, to use juridical principles to study robot ethics. For
him, many aspects of the law are thus applicable : as long
as robots remain simple, the principles defined for commer-
cial products suffice, whereas with autonomous robots the
diminished responsibility principle should be applied. Thus,
in cases where responsibility can not be assumed completely,
like it is the case with minors or people suffering from mental
disabilities, the law considers exceptions and, thus, could also
be applied to autonomous robots.
1) Penal law: The author goes further by examining the
frame of penal law in which the questions of what is a moral
agent and what punishment can be reasonably applied are
raised. In order to apply the penal law to judge a given crime,
one must find a moral agent to be held responsible otherwise
the crime is considered an accident. In the hypothetical case
of a robot committing a crime, could the robot be considered
sufficiently autonomous to have done the action by itself
? Several authors propose different ideas to answer this
question : Solumn [9] proposes the equivalent of a Turing
test to determine if the agent can be held responsible in court.
Harnard [10] gives a hierarchy of Turing tests and examines
their advantages and disadvantages and highlights the most
adequate test for robotics. More recently, Kahn et al. [11]
propose different metrics permitting the evaluation of the
resemblance between a robot and a human, which could be
used for responsibility ascription. Coleman [12] identifies
several characteristics that could be used for building a
framework of virtue ethics, whereas Floridi and Sanders in
[13] propose the concept of artificial agents for which they
are able to separate the agent’s morality and the agent’s
responsibility. However, to our knowledge, the question of
how to punish a robot for a crime remains unanswered.
2) Moral agency and robots: Although we agree with
Marino and Tamburrini that the law disposes of the necessary
tools to cope with current situations in robotics, we also
believe that it is important to consider the fact that, with
current technology, the question of responsibility ascription is
biased. In fact, even if machine learning is a very interesting
way of implementing adaptability, robot’s behavior is still
only the result of the application of an algorithmic process.
In other words, even if the computing process of a robot is
based on genetic algorithms, neural networks or any other
learning method, it still lacks free will.
Indeed, as it was shown by Kim and Sanders in [14],
the more autonomous the robots are, the more they are
considered as human and thus as responsible. However,
robots that we are building today are not able of taking
decisions (in the sense of making a free choice) and thus
can not be held responsible for their behavior. Thus, when
discussing responsibility ascription for robots, it is very
important to keep in mind this tendency to anthropomorphize
robots and our interactions with them. In the absence of
free will, an essential component of moral responsibility, we
think that the question of responsibility ascription remains
pretty simple : it has to be shared between the user and the
robot creator, exactly in the same way as for any machine.
Ethically, the creator is responsible for the possibilities that
he offers to the user, while the user is responsible for the
use he makes of such possibilities.
3) A biased problem: For us, the question of robot re-
sponsibility ascription is biased because of the importance
of history for the robot figure. To illustrate this, let us
examine the following situation: in the case where a real
dog causes damage or hurts somebody, the question of the
dog’s responsibility is never asked. If the dog is considered
dangerous, it is put down and the question of the owner’s
responsibility is then examined.
However, it is fair to consider that a dog is an autonomous
agent more highly evolved than anything robotics could
produce in the next fifteen years. However, in cases like the
one in our example, the question of the animal’s responsi-
bility is simply almost never questioned. Indeed, one could
expect that the dog, as a living, complex system should be
considered more responsible1 than a pre-programmed robot.
What is the fundamental difference that causes an ethical
issue to be raised in one case and not in the other ?
To our understanding, the fact that the situation is reversed
here can be explained by the fact that robots, although
still relatively simple compared to animals, are designed
to imitate human beings. Thus specific hopes, beliefs and
fears are projected onto them : there is an identification
phenomenon (anthropomorphization), which does not occur
with animals, such as dogs.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY FOR THE ROBOT
FIGURE
Robots, more than any other machine, are still surrounded
by an aura of mystery. By tracing the origins of this
concomitant uneasiness and attraction people feel towards
autonomous machines, we will show that the weight of
the myths and symbols related to them is primordial in
1It is interesting to note that, in the past, animals were penal subjects
and recordings of animal trials do exist [15]. A study of the emergence and
disappearance of such a phenomenon may help to understand the evolution
and the representation of the notion of responsibility.
roboethics. Indeed we will now show how they play a major
role in the definition of the ethical issues related to HRI
because they raise fundamental questions concerning the
motivations, dangers and implications of creating an artificial
human.
A. Antiquity at the origins of the myths
One of the first thoughts that comes to mind when robot
figures or myths are mentioned are generally related to the
literature or cinematography. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein,
Fritz Lang’s Metropolis or Asimov’s law of robotics are,
among others, well known and relatively recent western
allusions to this idea, which all have in common the fact
that they transmit stereotypical representations and symbols
related to robots. However, the subject is older than these few
examples from the last two centuries, and cultures as old as
ancient Greece or the Egypt of the pharaohs was already
preoccupied by this question.
For instance, one of the first allusions to autonomous artifi-
cial beings is found in Homer’s Iliad (book XVIII), in which
Hephaestus, the crippled god, builds golden servants and
golden seats that are able to move by themselves. Hesiod’s
Theogony is even more interesting from the myth point-of-
view because it relates to how the legendary Prometheus
made, out of clay, a man to whom he brought the secret of
fire so he could reproduce. However, because Prometheus
stole Zeus’ prerogative in the domain of giving life, he was
condemned to have his liver eaten everyday by an eagle,
a story which gave birth to what would be known as the
Prometheus myth.
B. Autonomous statues
In addition to the legendary or mythological figures and
machines we just mentioned, more or less complex automata
have also been built in Greece and in Egypt during Antiquity.
For example2, statues that could move a part of their body
(such as an arm linked to a string) or generate sounds
using fire were created. These idols, made by priests, were
supposed to be able to answer questions and to transmit the
will of the gods. Most of the time, the priest himself asked
the questions and “received” the answers by triggering the
different mechanisms.
This practice holds a deeper meaning than the simple trick
it appears to be. In fact, it comes to light with this ritual
that the introduction of a certain form of autonomy (or life),
even as simple as a head moving or a hand waving, seems
to bring a moral dimension to a statue because the priests
could “insert the soul in the effigy by a rite [. . . ] to give it
the power to speak and to do right or wrong” [16, p. 15, our
translation].
Such religious rites were common and such statues have
been found in various places such as Italy, India, China
and throughout Africa. We think that the popularity of these
rituals, in addition to the fact that they were certainly used
2The interested reader will find in [16] an interesting and deep historical
review of automaton.
by priests to convince credulous people, could play a non-
negligible role in understanding the origins of the question
of responsibility ascription. In fact, it shows that it is deeply
anchored, in many traditions, that autonomy acts as a strong
hint of the presence of discernment, a necessary building
block for moral responsibility.
C. The Middle Ages
Scientists and alchemists from the Middle Ages wanted
to do more than their predecessors by realizing a creature
of flesh without a woman. Whilst the idea was not new
(one of the first allusions of such a project appears in
Aristotle), people from the Middle Ages developed this idea
of biological reproduction in which the woman brought the
raw matter and the man the soul. This concept of homunculus
was partly developed by Paracelsus who even gave a recipe
for the creation of embryo. The symbolical sense of this
experience of the metal embryo lies in the desire to create
a being, to play God, as in Gœthe’s Faust. It explores the
limits between artificial production and natural reproduction.
Thus, if natural reproduction allows a share of uncertainty
about the characteristics of the child to come, the artificial
production of a human being is entirely controlled by the
creator. Therefore, he can then try to iteratively generate a
better creature based on the previous unperfect attempts.
This recurrence of Prometheus’ myth through history is
related to the fundamental question of what separates life
from death, in other words the definition of life. It is very
interesting to note that the questions highlighted by this myth
also find a modern echo in bioethics.
D. Dualism and rationality
Rational theories that appeared since the XVIth century
opposed this occultism. With his philosophy, Descartes rad-
ically separated body and soul. For him, because the body
was only a machine made of pipes and pumps, animals had
no consciousness and therefore did not differ much from
automata except in their complexity.
This famous “Cartesian Dualism” also postulates that Man
possesses something more : he is a machine with a soul. This
conception is still somewhat present nowadays and conflicts
with positivism, notably when it comes to determining if it
is possible for a robot to have a soul or feel pain.
1) Automata in literature: Since the XVIIthcentury, math-
ematical and technical developments have allowed the cre-
ation of increasingly complex mechanisms. This period is
marked by the appearance of automata like Vaucanson’s
duck or Pierre Jacquet-Droz’s androids, which were able to
imitate complex movements like writing or piano playing.
This development of automation has marked the literature.
From the Age of Enlightment, it began to interest writers :
Rabelais’ Gargantua occupies his leisure time with small
toys that can move by themselves and Cervante`s’ Don
Quichotte dreams of flying wooden horses. This era also
sees the development of science-fiction : Cyrano de Bergerac
of Edmond Rostand describes how insect-looking rockets
are propelled using gun powder and Ernst Hoffmann’s Le
Marchand de sable relates the story of a scientist whose
daughter, Olympia, is in reality an automaton.
In addition to these few examples, the Prometheus’ myth
has been incorporated more clearly in a number of works.
We will cite here only two of them : Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein and Carlo Collodi’s Pinocchio. In the first,
the creature is made out of human organs and reborn with
fatal consequences for its creator, whereas in Pinocchio,
the puppet carved in wood acquires a human status after a
journey of initiation. These two examples are very interesting
in our opinion because they propose two opposing and
complementary visions of the myth. Of course, they do
not cover the complexity of the question and we refer the
interested reader for example to [17] or [18] for a more
complete panorama.
E. The threat of the artificial intelligence
After the development of realistic automata came the
era of logical machines, such as Pascal’s calculator, that
threatened humanity’s unique ability to think. Leibniz’s hope
of realizing algorithmic reasoning was first made a reality
in the beginning of the XIXth century, at least partially, by
Count Stanhope who realized a machine that, using logical
notation, could use syllogisms to solve simple probability
problems. After him, Charles Babbage built, around 1829,
his Analytical Machine which, along with the one Jevons
built forty years later, served as a model for the first
computers. In fact, it is with the description of a method to
compute Bernouilli’s number with Babbage’s machine that
Ada Lovelace invented the notion of program. With her,
computer science was born.
This new science was then developed thanks to Boole’s
algebra and the invention of electronics components like the
relay that enabled the construction of increasingly complex
machines from the beginning of the XXth century. It was in
this context that Alan Turing formalized the concepts of al-
gorithm and calculability. His article, Computing Machinery
and Intelligence [19] was one of the first to ask the question
of artificial intelligence.
F. New medias to perpetuate the myth
The XXth also saw the development of new medias that
helped diffusing the myths surrounding robots. Science-
fiction novels made robots one of their favorite themes and,
to cite only two of them, authors like Isaac Asimov with
his cycle of the robots or William Gibson’s Neuromancer
propose two different visions of a possible future with robots.
Moreover, medias forms like the cinema have also been used
since the 1920’s to aliment the symbolical image surrounding
robotics [20]. In parallel, robot companions (Nono in Ulysse
31 for instance) or super heroes (like Astroboy, Goldorak)
present for example in japanese cartoons rise the ideal of a
perfect, protective friend, made out of bolts but also able of
feelings.
G. The two faces of the robots
In summary, in this section we have tried to emphasize
two things, namely, (1) autonomy inevitably evokes life and
existence, in the sense that we tend to consider as alive a
machine able to behave in an autonomous way, and (2) this
impression of life is both attractive and frightening, indeed,
while the possibility of creating the robot of our dreams is
attractive, our inability to forecast the behavior of such a
creature is repulsive and make us fear this power of creation.
IV. HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
Thanks to this succinct historical exploration, we saw how
a symbolic figure of the humanoid robot was built through
centuries in Western countries. This mythical representation
influences the way we perceive today’s and tomorrow’s
robots. Because of this, we argue here that the mythical
figure of the robot is accountable for a non negligible share
of the arguments used in the discourse on responsibility
ascription. Terms like autonomy, intelligence or decisions are
often used for robots, however it must be kept in mind that
they do not have the same meaning when used for humans.
Moreover, because the mythology and symbolism related to
the autonomous automata was historically and socially built,
it should also noted that if the cultural references differ
sufficiently, so will the the perception of robots as it was
shown by Kitano [21] or Bartneck [22].
A. A human perspective
The discourses we have examined consider that au-
tonomous robots, i.e. robots controlled using learning meth-
ods, are not to be taken only as plain machines but have
to be held responsible for their behaviors because those
latter cannot be forecasted (and thus the programmer is not
responsible). Then, as robots cannot be punished (because
they have no feelings and no notion of their own existence),
the question is to know who to blame.
It is worth here to discuss the notion of emergent behav-
ior : in most algorithms, the robot “chooses” its behavior
relatively to rules and optimality criteria that have been
pre-specified by the programmer. Thus, the outcome of the
process is completely predefined mathematically3, even if it
has not been explicitly implemented and if it is not known a
priori (only because we do not have an explicit knowledge
of the solutions of the optimization problem). For us, the
responsibility lies in the limitation of the possible behaviors
(of the space of solutions of the problem), not in the choice
of a particular behavior – and this limitation is totally up
to the programmer. To illustrate this, let us take again the
example of section II of an autonomous dog which selects
the behavior ”running” and bumps into a child. The important
point here is not that it has selected this behavior, but rather
that this potentially dangerous behavior was present in the
space of solutions.
Having this in mind, we propose here another perspective :
in our opinion, robots are, and will remain in the foreseeable
future, plain machines without the necessary moral principles
that allow one to ascribe them responsibility. This said, we
still consider that the ethical question of responsibility in
3We postulate here that the algorithm used converges to the optimal
solution
human-robot interactions remains primordial. However, we
believe that for the robots existing today and in the near
future, it can be addressed only from the human side of the
interaction even if mythology tends to indicate differently.
For us, the issue of responsibility in robotics relates only
to the robots’ creators and users. If responsibility ascription
for the user does not pose a particular problem from the
ethical point-of-view at this stage, the question of the ethical
position of the robot creator is more complex. In fact, it
raises the question of the scientist’s responsibility, not only
as a representant of a company or academy but also as a
member of a community.
B. The precautionary principle
Talking of the scientist’s responsibility also raises the
question of the interaction of technology and ethics, i.e.
what should humanity do with the powers it possesses ?
Hans Jonas, in his philosophical work on responsibility [23]
analyzes why since Man acquired technologies powerful
enough to destroy humanity, the scientist can not simply
stipulate that his interventions will be necessarily counter-
balanced by nature. He refuses the idea that technology
will always find solutions to the problems it creates. This
questioning is at the origin of the so-called precautionary
principle which appears as a sort of answer on how to tackle
the uncertain and unforeseeable consequences of human
actions. In this framework, questions such as “Why building
humanoid robots ?”, “What kind of technology do we want
to develop ?”, “Are robots useful to society ? Why ?” are
raised. Thus, it is important to consider that technics and
science in general are not neutral but are influenced by the
society.
V. CONCLUSION
The message of this article is that the ethical question
of responsibility ascription is strongly related, in Western
countries, to the mythical image of the robot. Indeed, there
is a gap between what robots effectively are and can do and
what people expect from them, basing them on their cultural
representation of the robot rather than on existing robots.
It is for sure pertinent to forecast a future with intelligent
robots and to question the related ethical questions, notably
in terms of our motivations as roboticists and of our in-
herent representation of a desirable society. However, if we
want to address the problem of roboethics in the upcoming
years, it is also important to consider pragmatically robots
as they are now and to get rid off all the mythological
aura that still surrounds humanoid robots today. Indeed,
through the question of responsibility, we have examined
how the small capabilities that today’s humanoid robots
possess already sketches complications for a future where
completely autonomous robots will be reality. It forecasts a
huge development of roboethics to control the mutations that,
like every technological revolution do, robotics will bring.
To complete our study, it would be interesting to analyze
how an ethic built on a different cultural background would
answer the responsibility ascription problem, an approach
that would allow us to analyze what part of the results
presented would be still valid in a different environment.
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